Subliminal
Priming and Persuasion:
Striking While The Iron is Hot
The Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology
38 (2002) 556-568
Subliminal Priming and Persuasion:
Striking while the iron is hot
Erin J Strahan
Steven J Spencer
Mark P Zanna
Naomi I. Eisenberger
Curtis D. Hardin
Stacey Sinclair
February 2002
|
Department of Psychology,
University of Waterloo,
200 E. University Ave., Waterloo, ON, Canada N2L 3G
Received 24 August 2001; revised 4 February 2002
Abstract
Three studies demonstrated that
subliminally priming a goal-relevant cognition (thirst in Studies 1 and 2; sadness in Study 3) influenced behavior
(in Study 1) and enhanced the persuasiveness of an ad targeting the goal (in Studies 2 and 3) when people were
motivated to pursue the goal (when they were thirsty in Studies 1 and 2; when they expected to interact with
another person in Study 3). These results suggest that subliminal priming can be used to enhance persuasion, but
only when certain conditions are met. Both the priming of goal-relevant cognitions and the motive to pursue the
goal were necessary for ads targeting the goal to be more persuasive. The implications of these results for the
role of functionality in subliminal priming and for the use and abuse of sub-liminal priming in persuasion are
discussed.
In 1957, James Vicary, an advertising executive from New Jersey, claimed to have increased Coke sales by 18% and
popcorn sales by over 50% by secretly flashing the words ‘‘EAT POPCORN’’ and ‘‘DRINK COKE’’ onto the movie screen
at a local theatre. People were outraged and alarmed. In actuality, Vicary was lying about the increased sales. He
had never flashed anything on the movie screen; it was just a hoax to save his floundering advertising company
(Weir, 1984).
Despite this dubious beginning, does subliminal per-suasion actually work? Many
people seem to think so. Millions of people buy subliminal self-help tapes to help them lose weight, improve their
self-esteem, or increase their assertiveness (Natale, 1988). Yet empirical studies suggest that these tapes are not
effective. Greenwald, Spangenberg, Pratkanis, and Eskenazi (1991) tested the effectiveness of commercially available
subliminal self-help tapes that claimed to increase either self-esteem or memory. After a month of use they found
that neither of the tapes produced their claimed effects. More generally, Pratkanis and Aronson (1992) examined over
150 arti-cles from the mass media and over 200 academic papers on subliminal processes. They found no clear
evidence that subliminal messages influence attitudes or behavior.
In contrast to these findings on subliminal persua-sion, however, a large
literature suggests that subliminal priming can be quite powerful. For example, Murphy and Zajonc (1993) have
demonstrated that subliminal priming can be used to influence people!s affective re-actions to an unfamiliar object.
In a series of experi-ments, Murphy and Zajonc found that participants liked Chinese ideographs that were preceded
by a sub-liminally presented smiling face better than the same ideographs preceded by a subliminally presented
scowling face. Using a similar paradigm, Krosnick, Betz, Jussim, and Lynn (1992) have even shown that the
subliminal presentation of positive and negative images can classically condition people!s impressions of
others.
Previous research has also demonstrated that sub-liminal priming can even affect
behavior (see Di-jksterhuis & Bargh, 2001 for a summary). For example, Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996) found
that partici-pants who were subliminally primed with an African-American face responded with more hostility to a
bothersome request made by the experimenter than participants subliminally primed with a Caucasian face.
If subliminal priming techniques can have such powerful influences on people!s
evaluations and behaviors, why have attempts at subliminal persuasion been largely
ineffective? We suspect that previous attempts at subliminal
persuasion have not harnessed the power of subliminal priming techniques in seeking to persuade people. In
particular, we propose that subliminal prim-ing can be used to prime goal-relevant cognitions, and that this
priming when combined with a motive to pursue the goal will make persuasive appeals targeting this goal
particularly effective. For example, sublimi-nally priming people with the concept of thirst should activate
thirst-related cognitions, and if these people are thirsty, ads that appeal to the thirst-quenching
proper-ties of a beverage should be particularly persuasive. In this way, subliminal priming can be used to
enhance the effectiveness of standard persuasive
appeals.
One might wonder why subliminally priming a goal-relevant cognition does not
always enhance the persuasiveness of an advertisement that targets this goal. Why, for example, would priming
thirst-related cognitions not always enhance the effectiveness of an ad that highlights the thirst-quenching
properties of a beverage? Why is being thirsty also necessary? In our view, it would not be adaptive for people to
pursue every goal every time it is activated. Following Higgins! (1996) notion that acti-vated cognitions primarily
affect behavior in situations in which these cognitions are applicable, we propose that being primed with
goal-relevant cognitions will only lead to enhanced effectiveness of an ad that targets the goal in situations in
which they are motivated to pursue the goal. In our view, then, being primed with a goal-relevant cognition is
necessary but not sufficient to in-crease the persuasiveness of an ad targeting the goal: one must not only be primed
with the goal-relevant cogni-tion but one must also have the motive to pursue the goal in order for the
goal-relevant cognition to direct behavior.
One might also wonder why the motive to pursue a goal would not always enhance the
persuasiveness of an advertisement that targets this goal. Why, for example, would being thirsty not always enhance
the effectiveness of an ad that
highlights the thirst-quenching properties of a beverage? Why is priming also necessary? At first blush it might
seem that we would always be more persuaded by an ad that targets one of our goals, but we are complex organisms
that have to manage many different goal pursuits. In our view, having a goal is nec-essary but not
sufficient to increase the persuasiveness of an ad targeting the goal: One
must not only have the goal but one must have goal-related cognitions activated as well to increase the priority of
the goal.
In the present research, we plan to prime subliminally two different goal-relevant
cognitions. In both cases we expect that this priming will influence goal-relevant be-havior including the
persuasiveness of an ad targeting the goal only in situations in which people are motivated to pursue the goal. In
Study 1, we subliminally prime people with the words ‘‘thirst’’ and ‘‘dry’’ and measure how much they drink in a
later task. We expect that these primes will increase drinking primarily when people are thirsty. In Study 2, we
subliminally prime people who are thirsty with the words ‘‘thirst’’ and ‘‘dry’’ and assess the persuasiveness of an
advertisement that highlights the thirst-quenching properties of a sports drink. We expect that priming will
enhance persuasion. In Study 3, we subliminally prime people with a sad face when they are either motivated or not
motivated to repair their mood and measure the persuasiveness of an advertisement that highlights the
mood-restoring properties of a rock band. We expect that priming will enhance persuasion, but only among people who
are motivated to repair their mood.
Study 1
To examine whether subliminal priming would affect people!s behavior primarily when
they were motivated, we examined whether subliminal thirst-related primes would lead to increased drinking among
people who were thirsty. We also measured participants! explicit ratings of their thirst at three points in the
experiment. These ratings were embedded in a larger mood scale in an attempt to prevent the supraliminal priming of
thirst for all participants. The first measurement of thirst al-lowed us to demonstrate that there were no
differences between conditions in participants! reported thirst when they came to the lab. The second measure of
thirst allowed us to demonstrate that our manipulation of thirst was effective. Importantly, the third measure of
thirst allowed us to determine whether our subliminal priming procedure had an affect on participants! explicit
ratings of thirst. Although it is conceivable that the subliminal prime would influence participants! explicit
ratings of thirst, an effect on drinking without an effect on explicit ratings of thirst would be consistent with the
notion that the prime affected participants outside of their conscious awareness. We measured participants! drinking
behavior in a taste-testing context in which the beverages were cloyingly sweet in an attempt to create a more
sensitive measure of drinking behavior. Finally, in a preliminary subliminality check we tested whether our
subliminal priming procedure was indeed subliminal.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 81 under-graduates at the University of
Waterloo (42 males and 39 females). All participants received one experimental credit for their participation. The
study was a 2 (thirst condition: thirsty vs. not thirsty) ! 2 (subliminal prime: thirst-related vs. neutral words)
factorial design. The main dependent variable, the amount (in ml) of two beverages participants consumed, was
unobtrusively assessed in the taste-testing phase of the experiment.
Procedure. Participants took part in the experiment individually. Before the
experimental session, each par-ticipant was contacted and asked to participate in a marketing study in which they
would eat and drink and then evaluate a number of different products. In line with the cover story, they were asked
not to eat or drink anything for 3 h before the experimental session. This instruction ensured that all
participants would be ini-tially at least somewhat thirsty.
When participants arrived at the experimental ses-sion, we first confirmed that
they did not have anything to eat or drink for 3 h, and then asked them to complete a mood scale ostensibly to
control for the impact of their mood on their evaluations of the products. Embedded within this 9-item mood scale
was an item that assessed their explicit level of thirst. Participants indicated how thirsty they felt on a 1–7
scale (‘‘not at all thirsty’’ to ‘‘very thirsty’’). Participants then performed a ‘‘taste test’’ on two different
types of cookies. Following this taste test, thirst was manipulated by telling half of the participants ‘‘to
cleanse your palate by drinking as much water as you want.’’ The other half of the participants did not receive any
water. After this manipulation, participants again completed the mood scale that in-cluded the explicit measure of
thirst.
Next, participants were instructed to complete a lex-ical decision task (LDT) that
afforded us the opportu-nity to administer our subliminal priming manipulation. For this task, participants sat
approximately 30 cm from a Macintosh LC computer with a screen resolution of 512 ! 384 dots/in. and a refresh rate
of 67 Hz. The color depth of the monitor was set to monochrome, and the background was set to white. Each trial
began with a 1-second presentation of an asterisk on which participants were instructed to focus.
In the context of this computer task, half of the participants were subliminally
primed with thirst-re-lated words (i.e., thirst, dry) and the other half were subliminally primed with neutral
words (i.e., pirate, won). As in all our studies, the experimenter was blind to the subliminal priming condition.
The thirst-related primes and the neutral primes were matched for both length of word and frequency of use in the
English language. The subliminal prime was flashed in the parafoveal field (i.e., at one of eight equally spaced
lo-cations 7.6 cm from the fixation point and subtended a visual angle of approximately 1L, cf., Bargh &
Pietro-monaco, 1982; Nelson & Loftus, 1980; Rayner, 1978) for approximately 16 ms.
Each of the primes appeared on 13 trials for a total of 26 trials in which a
subliminal prime was presented. After the subliminal prime, a mask, consisting of a series of x!s, appeared for 102
ms in the exact spot where the prime had been presented. Following the mask, partic-ipants saw a target letter
string for the LDT. Partici-pants indicated whether the letter string was a word or not and their response latency
for this decision was measured. These target letter strings consisted of 22 words and 17 non-words. A subliminal
prime was, therefore, presented before two-thirds of the trials. Only the mask was presented on the remaining
trials to reduce the chance that participants would perceive the prime.
Following the LDT, participants again completed the mood scale that contained the
explicit rating of thirst. Finally, they performed a second taste test in which they evaluated two different
beverages. These beverages were actually Kool-Aid made with extra sugar so that they would be very sweet and
therefore not overly thirst quenching. Participants were left alone in the room and told they could drink as much
of the beverages as they wanted while they evaluated the beverages. Following this taste test, participants were
debriefed and thanked for their participation. After participants had left, the experimenter measured how much of
the beverages they had consumed.
Subliminality check. Following procedures similar to those used by Bargh and
Pietromanoco (1982) and Devine (1989), we ran a separate set of 46 participants through a procedure similar to
Study 1 to determine if our subliminal priming procedure was, indeed, sublim-inal. The procedure was the same as
the thirsty condi-tions of Study 1 except that instead of performing the final taste test on the Kool-Aid beverages
participants made on-line guesses about what primes were sublimi-nally presented during the LDT.
Participants were told that they had two tasks to perform. The first task involved
identifying the letter strings as words or not and the second task involved guessing what word had been quickly
flashed immedi-ately before the row of x!s (i.e., the mask) appeared.
For this task, we had two types of matched trials: one set of trials in which a
prime was presented subliminally and a matched set of trials in which a prime was not presented. After the
subliminal prime was presented (or not presented in the matched trials) a mask appeared in the exact spot where the
word had been presented (or would have been presented). Following the presentation of the mask, participants saw a
target letter string for the LDT. Participants indicated whether the letter string was a word or not. Following the
letter string, a multi-ple-choice question asked participants to identify the word that was flashed before the
mask. In each trial, in which a prime was presented, the prime appeared, along with three distracter words. In each
matched trial, in which a prime was not presented, participants responded to exactly the same multiple choice
question. At the conclusion of the experiment, all participants were fully debriefed as to the purpose and design
of the experiment and thanked for their participation.
Results and discussion
Subliminality check. To test whether participants could detect the primes, we
compared the percentage of times the primes were chosen when the primes were presented with the percentage of times
these same primes were chosen in the matched trials when primes were not presented. In the thirst-related prime
condition, when primes were actually presented, participants chose the primes (i.e., thirst or dry) on average
24.6% of the time. On the matched trials when the primes were not pre-sented, participants chose them 26.1% of the
time. In the neutral prime condition, when primes were actually presented, participants chose the primes (i.e.,
pirate or won) 23.9% of the time. On the matched trials when the primes were not presented, participants chose them
27.4% of the time. These percentages are not significantly different from chance (ts < 1:14, ps > :26) or from
one another (ts < 1:26, ps > :22). These results support the notion that the priming procedure was
subliminal.
Explicit ratings of thirst. To determine whether par-ticipants were at least
somewhat thirsty when they ar-rived, we had them rate their explicit thirst on a 1–7 scale, with higher numbers
indicating higher levels of thirst. At the outset participants rated their explicit level of thirst as moderate (M
¼ 4:36). There were no differences among the (yet to be manipulated) conditions (F s < 1).
After tasting the cookies, half of the participants were given a glass of water
and half were not, and then all participants rated their explicit thirst on the same 1–7 scale. A three-way ANCOVA
with thirst condition, subliminal priming condition (yet to be manipulated) and sex as the three
between-participants factors and level of thirst at the beginning of the experimental session as a covariate was
conducted to determine if the ma-nipulation of thirst was effective. Participant!s initial le-vel of thirst was a
significant covariate (F ð1; 72Þ ¼ 22:96, p < :001).2 As expected, the only other effect revealed by the ANCOVA
was the main effect for thirst condition. Participants who had received water rated themselves as less thirsty (Madj
¼ 3:45, SD ¼ 1:72) than participants who had not received any water (Madj ¼ 4:86, SD ¼ 1:58) (F ð1; 72Þ ¼ 16:56, p
< :001). Thus, our manipulation of thirst appears to have been effective.
Following the LDT, participants rated their explicit thirst for the last time.
Participants who did not receive water again reported feeling significantly more thirsty (Madj ¼ 5:03, SD ¼ 1:46) than participants who were given water (Madj ¼ 3:95, SD ¼ 1:61) (F ð1;
72Þ ¼ 17:93, p < :001). Not surprisingly, participants who were
sub-liminally primed with thirst-related words did not report greater explicit levels of thirst (Madj ¼ 4:71, SD ¼
1:58) than participants who were subliminally primed with neutral words (Madj ¼ 4:43, SD ¼ 1:61) (F <
1).
Drinking behavior. Our hypothesis was that the subliminal priming procedure would
affect how much par-ticipants drank when they were thirsty, but not when they were satiated. To test this prediction
we conducted a three-way ANOVA with thirst condition, subliminal priming condition and sex of the participant as
the be-tween-participants factors. This ANOVA revealed a main effect of subliminal priming condition. Participants
who received thirst-related primes drank significantly more liquid than participants who received the neutral
primes (F ð1; 73Þ ¼ 4:05, p < :05). Although this analysis did not reveal an interaction between thirst
condition and subliminal priming condition that reached a con-ventional level of significance (F ð1; 73Þ ¼ 2:06, p
¼ :15), as can be seen in Fig. 1, simple main effect analyses re-vealed that the significant main effect was
primarily due to the fact that participants who received the thirst-re-lated primes drank more than participants
who received the neutral primes when they were thirsty (F ð1; 73Þ ¼ 5:60, p < :05). In contrast, when
participants were not thirsty, the subliminal priming condition had no effect (F ð1; 73Þ < 1).
Moreover, a planned contrast testing our specific hypothesis that thirsty
participants who received the thirst-related primes would drink significantly more than participants in the other
three conditions was sig-nificant (F ð1; 73Þ ¼ 4:37, p < :05),3 and when the variance accounted for by this
contrast is removed, the re-sidual variance is not significant (F ¼ 1:04).
The results from Study 1 suggest that subliminal priming affects people!s behavior
primarily when they were motivated. Specifically, priming thirst-related cognitions affected people!s drinking
behavior primarily when they were thirsty, but seemed to have little effect when they were satiated. In Study 2, we
want to extend these findings by examining how subliminal priming of thirst-related concepts affects
persuasion.
Study 2
Study 1 demonstrated that thirst-related subliminal primes can affect people!s
drinking behavior when they are thirsty. But can such priming be harnessed to af-fect the persuasiveness of an
advertisement? We think so. Given the results of Study 1, in this study we in-cluded only thirsty participants. We
expect that when thirsty participants receive thirst-related subliminal primes they will be more susceptible to and
more persuaded by an advertisement for a thirst-quenching sports beverage than by an advertisement for a simi-larly
attractive electrolyte-restoring sports beverage. When thirsty participants receive neutral subliminal primes,
however, we do not expect that they will be more persuaded by an advertisement for a thirst-quenching sports
beverage than by an advertisement for a similarly attractive electrolyte-restoring sports beverage. Even though
they are motivated to quench their thirst this is just one of the many motives they are likely to have in this
situation and unless thoughts related to this motive are activated they are unlikely to pursue it.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 35 under-graduates at the University of
Waterloo (11 males and 24 females) who received one experimental credit for their participation. The experiment had
two conditions. Thirsty participants received either thirst-related primes or neutral primes, and then viewed
advertisements for two types of sports beverages: a thirst-quenching bev-erage called Super-Quencher and an
electrolyte-restor-ing beverage called PowerPro. Participants! evaluations of these ads and their choice of
price-reducing coupons for these beverages were the primary dependent vari-ables.
Procedure. Participants were contacted under the same cover story, given the same
pre-lab instructions, and followed the same procedures as the participants in the thirsty condition of Study 1,
except that after the computer task they did not engage in the drinking taste test.
Instead, they were asked to examine and evaluate print advertisements for two
sports drinks: Super-Quencher and PowerPro. Participants were informed that the marketing department at the
University of Waterloo was pilot testing advertisements for two new sports drinks, soon to be available in stores.
The Super-Quencher ad was designed to convey the message that Super-Quencher was the best thirst-quenching beverage
ever developed. In contrast, the PowerPro ad was de-signed to convey the message that PowerPro was the best
electrolyte-restoring beverage ever developed. These ads were pilot tested to ensure that participants rated
Super-Quencher as more thirst-quenching and PowerPro as more electrolyte-restoring. This pilot test also revealed
that participants had moderately positive and equivalent evaluations of the two sports drinks.
Participants evaluated these ads at the same time by completing two
questionnaires: one for Super-Quencher and one for PowerPro. The questionnaires asked par-ticipants to indicate how
strongly they agreed with statements on a 1–7 scale with higher numbers indicat-ing greater agreement. Two
statements served as ma-nipulation checks. They were, ‘‘I think Super-Quencher (or PowerPro) will be very effective
at quenching my thirst’’ and ‘‘I think Super-Quencher (or PowerPro) will be very effective at replacing my
electrolytes.’’ A final statement served as the main dependent variable. It was, ‘‘Overall, I think Super-Quencher
(or PowerPro) is a great sports drink.’’
After evaluating the sports beverages, participants were told that the company
that developed the bever-ages wanted to thank participants by giving them a total of nine coupons, each worth 50
cents off the purchase price of the beverages. Participants were told to indicate how many coupons they wanted for
Super-Quencher and how many coupons they wanted for PowerPro. Participants were then debriefed and thanked for
their participation.
Results and discussion
Explicit ratings of thirst. As in Study 1, participants indicated how thirsty they
felt at three different times during the experimental session. When participants ar-rived for the session, there was
a significant difference between the (yet to be manipulated) prime conditions (F ð1; 34Þ ¼ 5:34, p < :05).
Participants randomly as-signed to the thirst-related prime condition reported lower explicit ratings of thirst (M
¼ 3:65) than partici-pants randomly assigned to the neutral prime condition (M ¼ 5:05). Because of this
pre-existing difference, we controlled for initial ratings of explicit thirst in all of our analyses in which it was
a significant covariate.
After the cookie taste-test participants again rated their explicit level of
thirst. An ANCOVA of this mea-sure with participants! initial explicit rating of thirst as a covariate revealed
that participants! initial rating of thirst predicted their second rating of thirst (F ð1; 33Þ ¼ 74:7, p <
:001). Controlling for participants! initial rat-ing of thirst, there was no difference between the (yet to be
manipulated) prime conditions on participants! sec-ond explicit rating (F < 1). Participants randomly as-signed
to the thirst-related prime condition reported similar explicit ratings of thirst (Madj ¼ 5:21) to partici-pants
randomly assigned to the neutral prime condition (Madj ¼ 4:95).
Following the computer task in which participants received either thirst-related
or neutral primes, partici-pants rated their explicit level of thirst for a third time. An ANCOVA of this measure
with participants! initial explicit rating of thirst as a covariate revealed that participants! initial rating of
thirst predicted their third rating of thirst (F ð1; 33Þ ¼ 45:09, p < :001). Controlling for participants!
initial rating of thirst, there was no difference between the (now manipulated) prime condi-tions on participants!
third explicit rating (F ð1; 33Þ ¼ 1:55, p ¼ :22). Participants who received thirst-related primes continued to
report similar explicit ratings of thirst (Madj ¼ 4:78, SD ¼ :752) to participants who re-ceived neutral primes
(Madj ¼ 5:38, SD ¼ 1:09).
Manipulation checks. Before testing the hypothesis that participants who received
thirst-related primes would be more persuaded by the Super-Quencher ad than participants who received neutral
primes, we had to ensure that participants believed that Super-Quencher was more thirst-quenching than PowerPro and
that PowerPro was better at restoring electrolytes than Su-per-Quencher.
To test whether participants rated Super-Quencher as more thirst-quenching than
PowerPro, we conducted a 2 ! 2 mixed-model ANOVA with subliminal priming condition (thirst-related words vs.
neutral words) as the between-participants factor and sports beverage (Super-Quencher vs. PowerPro) as the
within-participants fac-tor. Regardless of which subliminal priming condition they were in, participants rated
Super-Quencher (M ¼ 5:40) as more thirst-quenching than PowerPro (M ¼ 4:46) (F ð1; 33Þ ¼ 13:31, p <
:01).
To test whether participants rated PowerPro as more electrolyte-restoring than
Super-Quencher, we con-ducted a 2 ! 2 mixed-model ANOVA. Regardless of which subliminal priming condition they were
in, par-ticipants rated PowerPro (M ¼ 5:29) as more electrolyte-restoring than Super-Quencher (M ¼ 3:97) (F ð1; 33Þ
¼ 30:04, p < :001).
Persuasiveness of the advertisement for the thirst-quenching beverage. To assess
the overall persuasiveness of the Super-Quencher ad, we created an index by combining the difference between
participants! ratings of Super-Quencher and PowerPro and the number of Su-per-Quencher coupons chosen. The two
measures were highly correlated (r ¼ :71, p < :001). In creating this index, we standardized each of these
variables after controlling for initial explicit ratings of thirst.4
To test our prediction that participants who received the thirst-related primes
would be more persuaded by the Super-Quencher ad than participants who received the neutral primes, we conducted an
ANOVA on this persuasion index. As expected, participants who re-ceived thirst-related primes (M ¼ :39) were more
per-suaded by the Super-Quencher ad than participants who received neutral primes (M ¼ %:33) (F ð1; 32Þ ¼ 4:76, p
< :05). Because the two measures that contributed to the persuasion index were highly correlated, it is not
surprising that they both were individually influenced by the subliminal priming manipulation. We now examine each
of these measures separately.
Ratings of the sports beverages. To analyze the effect of the subliminal priming
conditions on participants! ratings of the sports drinks we conducted a 2 ! 2 mixed-model ANCOVA with subliminal
priming condition (thirst-related vs. neutral primes) as the between-par-ticipants factor, with sports drink
(Super-Quencher vs. PowerPro) as the within-participants factor, and with initial explicit rating of thirst as the
covariate.
This analysis revealed that initial explicit rating of thirst was a marginally
significant covariate (F ð1; 32Þ ¼ 2:40, p < :15). There was also a marginally significant interaction between
subliminal priming condition and type of sports drink (F ð1; 32Þ ¼ 3:76, p < :06).
As can be seen in Fig. 2, participants who received the thirst-related primes
rated Super-Quencher as a better sports drink than PowerPro (F ð1; 32Þ ¼ 6:89, p ¼ :01), whereas participants who
received neutral primes rated these beverages similarly (F < 1). In addition, partici-pants who received
thirst-related primes tended to rate Super-Quencher more positively than participants who received neutral primes
(F ð1; 32Þ ¼ 3:04, p < :10).
Coupon choice. Because participants! choice of Super-Quencher and PowerPro coupons
were not independent, to analyze the effect of the subliminal priming conditions on participants! coupon choice, we
conducted an AN-COVA with subliminal priming condition as the sole factor, initial explicit rating of thirst as the
covariate, and the number of Super-Quencher coupons chosen as the dependent variable.
This analysis revealed that participants! initial explicit rating of thirst was a
marginally significant covariate (F ð1; 32Þ ¼ 3:09, p < :10), and as expected, participants who received
thirst-related primes chose more Super-Quencher coupons (Madj ¼ 5:31) than participants who received neutral primes
(Madj ¼ 4:27) (F ð1; 32Þ ¼ 4:28, p < :05).
We also analyzed the coupon data nonparametrically by comparing the number of
participants who chose more Super-Quencher coupons to the number of par-ticipants who chose more PowerPro coupons.
When participants received thirst-related primes, 76% chose more Super-Quencher coupons than PowerPro coupons
showing a clear preference for the Super-Quencher beverage (v2ð1Þ ¼ 4:76, p < :05). In contrast, when
participants received neutral primes, 42% chose more Super-Quencher coupons than PowerPro coupons, showing no
systematic preference (v2ð1Þ ¼ :24, ns). Thus, participants who received thirst-related primes chose more
Super-Quencher coupons than participants who received neutral primes (v2ð1Þ ¼ 4:36, p < :05).
Follow-up studies. We also conducted two follow-up studies to test the reliability
and generalizability of our findings. One study (N ¼ 69) employed the same basic design and procedure as Study 2,
but also manipulated whether the primes were subliminal or supraliminal. The subliminal primes again appeared for
16 ms, whereas the supraliminal primes appeared for 300 ms. When partici-pants received neutral primes, regardless
of whether they were subliminal or supraliminal, participants choice of coupons did not reflect a preference for
Super-Quencher over PowerPro (v2ð1Þ ¼ :03, ns). In contrast, when par-ticipants received thirst-related primes,
regardless of whether they were subliminal or supraliminal, partici-pants choice of coupons did reflect a clear
preference for Super-Quencher over PowerPro (v2ð1Þ ¼ 5:73, p < :05). This preference for Super-Quencher was
virtually iden-tical in the subliminal and supraliminal conditions. Of the participants who received subliminal
thirst-related primes, 64% chose more Super-Quencher coupons. Of those who received supraliminal thirst-related
primes, 66% chose more Super-Quencher coupons.
This lack of difference between the subliminal and supraliminal primes is consistent
with arguments made by Bargh (1992) and by Wilson and Brekke (1994). These authors suggest that what is critical
about a prime is not whether it is subliminal or supraliminal, but rather whether people realize that the prime is
influencing them and whether they have the ability to control this influ-ence. Given this line of reasoning, it is
not surprising that we did not find differences between the subliminal and supraliminal primes in our follow-up
study—in the supraliminal prime condition the 300 ms exposure probably afforded participants little chance to
appreci-ate the possible influence of the primes and even less ability to control this influence.
This reasoning, however, does not suggest that su-praliminal and subliminal primes
will always produce the same effects. If a supraliminal prime allows people to understand its influence and allows
them to control this influence, whereas a subliminal prime does neither, then supraliminal and subliminal primes
should lead to dif-ferent results. For example, if people perceive a supra-liminal prime to be part of a persuasive
maneuver and have the ability to resist this persuasion, then supra-liminal primes might create reactance and
eliminate the effect of the persuasive appeal, whereas subliminal primes might still enhance the effect of the
persuasive appeal.
We also conducted a study (N ¼ 57) to rule out the possibility that collecting
participants! explicit ratings of thirst enhanced the effect of the subliminal primes. Even though participants!
explicit ratings of thirst were em-bedded in a larger mood scale, it is conceivable that the subliminal primes
could have been more powerful be-cause participants responded to these measures. There-fore, we conducted a
replication of Study 2 in which we eliminated the explicit ratings of thirst from the mood scale.6 The results of
this study were essentially the same as Study 2. Participants who received the sad-face prime rated the music as
significantly more sad and gloomy (M ¼ 6.38) than participants who received the thirst-re-lated primes rated
Super-Quencher (M ¼ 4:71) more positively than PowerPro (M ¼ 4:35) (F ð1; 56Þ ¼ 3:93, p ¼ :05) and more positively
than participants who re-ceived the neutral primes (M ¼ 4:13) (F ð1; 56Þ ¼ 4:40, p < :05). In addition, exactly
50% of the participants who received neutral primes chose more Super-Quencher coupons (v2ð1Þ ¼ 0). In contrast, 71%
of participants who received thirst-related primes chose more Super-Quencher coupons (v2ð1Þ ¼ 5:76, p <
:05).
Meta-analyses. Across all three studies (i.e., Study 2, plus the two follow-up
studies) participants who re-ceived the thirst-related primes rated Super-Quencher more positively than PowerPro (z
¼ 2:43, p < :02) and more positively than participants who received the neutral primes (z ¼ 1:95, p ¼ :05).7 A
meta-analysis also indicates that participants who received the thirst-re-lated primes chose more Super-Quencher
coupons (70%) (z ¼ 3:60, p < :0005), whereas exactly 50% of the par-ticipants who received the neutral primes
chose more Super-Quencher coupons. The difference between these conditions suggests that subliminal priming
increased Super-Quencher!s ‘‘market share’’ by 20% (z ¼ 3:02, p < :005). Finally, a meta-analysis that combined
both attitude and behavior measures indicates that overall there is strong evidence that subliminal priming
enhanced persuasion. Participants who received the thirst-related primes were more persuaded by the Super-Quencher
ad than participants who received the neutral primes (z ¼ 2:86, p < :005).
Taken together the results of Studies 1 and 2 dem-onstrate subliminal priming
influences people!s behavior primarily when people are motivated. When people were thirsty, subliminal priming led
to increased drinking in Study 1 and enhanced persuasion in Study 2. But the question remains, are these results
unique to the domain of thirst? In Study 3, we attempt to conceptually repli-cate these results in a different
domain.
Study 3
In the current study, we plan to test whether sub-liminally priming people with a
sad face can activate the concept of sadness and whether such priming will en-hance the persuasiveness of an ad for
a mood-restoring product primarily in situations in which people are motivated to restore their mood. One such
situation seems to be when people expect to interact with another person. Research by Erber, Wegner, and Therriault
(1996) suggests that when people expect to interact with another person they are motivated to restore their mood,
but when they expect to be alone they are not so motivated. Specifically, these researchers found that sad
participants, who thought they would interact in the near future with another person, were much more likely to read
cheerful newspaper stories in an attempt to restore their mood than sad participants who expected to be alone.
Based on this research, we expect that when people are primed with a sad face and they expect to interact with
another person (i.e., they are motivated to restore their mood) they will be more persuaded by an add for a
mood-restoring product.
In contrast, if people are primed with a neutral stimuli, even if they expect to
interact with another person, there is little reason to expect that sadness would be activated and, hence, that
mood restoration would play any role in their evaluation of the product. Like-wise, if people are primed with a sad
face, but do not expect to interact with others, following Erber et al. (1996), we do not expect that people will
be motivated to restore their mood and therefore the activation of the concept of sadness will not be applicable to
their eval-uation of products in this situation. If these expectations are correct, then ads that feature
mood-restoring char-acteristics of a product should be more persuasive pri-marily when people receive a subliminal
sad-face prime in situations in which they expect to interact with an-other person.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 90 under-graduates at the University of
Waterloo (49 males and 41 females). All participants received one experimental credit for their participation in
the study. The study was a 2 (subliminal priming condition: sad-face prime vs. neutral prime) ! 2 (future task
expectation: expect to interact with another person vs. alone) factorial design. Participants! evaluations of the
compact discs (CDs) by an upbeat, mood-restoring band and a musically inno-vative band, and the number of songs
they chose to listen to from each CD were the primary dependent variables.
Procedure. Upon arrival at the experimental session, participants were told that
they would be participating in three decision-making experiments: an LDT study, a marketing study and a
problem-solving study. In de-scribing these experiments, we manipulated participants! future task expectation by
telling them that they would be completing the problem-solving study either alone or with another person. In
actuality, participants never engaged in the problem-solving study and completed the entire experiment
individually.
The first study that participants actually engaged in was the LDT. Before
beginning this task, they were asked to complete a mood scale under the guise that the LDT was sensitive to mood.
Embedded within this 9-item scale were two items that measured participants! explicit ratings of sadness and
happiness, respectively, on 7-point scales.
The LDT was similar to the one described in Study 1 and 2 except the primes were
different. In the context of the LDT half the participants received a sad-face prime (a black and white photograph,
taken from Eckman & Friesen, 1982). The other half of the participants re-ceived a neutral prime (i.e., an
oval). The subliminal prime was presented in the parafoveal field (i.e., at one of eight equally spaced locations
7.6 cm from the fixation point and subtended a visual angle of approximately 1L) for approximately 16 ms followed
immediately by a mask that contained many scribbled lines (cf., Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998) that
was presented for 102 ms. The subliminal prime was presented before 26 of the 39 lexical decisions. Following the
LDT, par-ticipants completed the mood scale for a second and final time.
Next, participants completed the marketing study in which they were asked to
evaluate ads for two debut CDs. One ad described the music of a band called ‘‘Tweed Monkeys’’ as energetic, upbeat,
and lively. It included the claim, ‘‘If you are looking for a CD that will put you in a good mood, this is the CD
for you.’’ In contrast, the other ad described the music of a band called ‘‘Crystal Hammer’’ as vibrant, strong,
and mu-sically creative. It included the claim, ‘‘If you like music with a strong sound, you will love this CD.’’
These ads were pilot tested to ensure that participants rated the Tweed Monkeys CD as more likely to restore their
mood and the Crystal Hammer CD as more musically creative. This pilot test also revealed participants had
moderately positive and equivalent overall evaluations of the two CDs.
Participants evaluated these ads at the same time by completing two
questionnaires: one for the Tweed Monkeys and one for Crystal Hammer. The question-naires asked participants to
indicate how strongly they agreed with statements on a 1–7 scale with higher numbers indicating greater agreement.
Two statements served as manipulation checks. They were, ‘‘I think lis-tening to this CD would put me in a positive
mood’’ and ‘‘I think this band would be very creative.’’ Two other statements served as measures of the
persuasiveness of the ads. They were, ‘‘I think I would enjoy listening to this CD’’ and ‘‘I would want to buy this
CD.’’
After evaluating the CDs, participants were told they could listen to the CDs, but
due to time constraints they could only listen to seven songs. Participants indicated the number of songs by Tweed
Monkeys and the num-ber of songs by Crystal Hammer to which they wanted to listen. After making this choice they
were informed that the experiment was over, were debriefed, and thanked for their participation.
Does a subliminal sad-face prime activate sadness im-plicitly? In Studies 1 and 2,
we primed participants with thirst-related words and assumed, based on previous research, that these primes would
activate thirst-related concepts. In Study 3, however, it is less clear that a subliminal sad-face prime will
activate sadness implicitly. To test this proposition, we subliminally primed a separate set of 49 participants
with a sad face or an oval and had them rate a sad and gloomy piece of music (i.e., Prokofiev!s Russia Under the
Mongolian Yoke). We subliminally primed participants using the LDT task described above and then had them rate the
sad piece of music on the following 7-point, bipolar dimensions: sad–happy and gloomy–cheerful. Our assumption is
that asking people about how sad and gloomy a piece of music is constitutes an implicit measure of mood, and would
be more sensitive to the effect of a subliminal sad-face prime than an explicit measure, in which people were asked
directly about their mood. If subliminally priming a sad face can activate sadness implicitly, then participants
who received the sad-face prime should rate the sad music as more sad and gloomy than participants who receive the
neutral prime.
Results and discussion
Does a subliminal sad-face prime activate sadness im-plicitly? To test whether the
subliminal sad-face prime activated sadness implicitly, we computed an index of implicit sadness by combining
participants! ratings of the sad piece of music as sad and as gloomy. These two measures were highly correlated (r
¼ :62, p < :01). An ANOVA revealed that participants who received the sad-face prime rated the music as
significantly more sad and gloomy (M ¼ 6:38) than participants who received the neutral prime (M ¼ 5:85) (F ð1; 48Þ
¼ 3:98 p < :05). Thus, our subliminal sad-face prime appeared to activate sadness implicitly in this separate
set of participants.
Explicit ratings of mood. Participants in the main study rated their explicit
happiness and their explicit sadness at two different times during the experiment. When participants arrived for the
session, they rated themselves as moderately happy (M ¼ 4:81) and as not at all sad (M ¼ 1:86). There were no
differences between the future task expectation conditions or the (yet to be manipulated) subliminal priming
conditions (F s < 1).
Following the LDT in which the subliminal prime was manipulated, participants
again rated their explicit happiness and their explicit sadness. Not surprisingly, there continued to be no
differences between partici-pants in the various experimental conditions (F s < 1). Thus, neither the future task
expectation manipulation nor the subliminal priming manipulation had an effect on participants! explicit ratings of
their mood.
Manipulation checks. To ensure that participants rated the Tweed Monkeys CD as
more likely to restore their mood and the Crystal Hammer CD as more mu-sically creative, we conducted a 2 ! 2 ! 2
mixed-model ANOVA with subliminal priming condition (sad-face prime vs. neutral prime) and future task expectation
(expect to interact with another person vs. alone) as the between-participants factors and CD (Tweed Monkeys vs.
Crystal Hammer) as the within-participants factor. Regardless of which subliminal priming condition they were in
and whether they expected to interact with an-other person or be alone, participants rated the Tweed Monkeys CD as
more likely to restore their mood (M ¼ 4:89) than the Crystal Hammer CD (M ¼ 4:34) (F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 18:27, p <
:001), and rated the Crystal Hammer CD as more musically creative (M ¼ 4:97) than the Tweed Monkeys CD (M ¼ 4:13)
(F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 48:94, p < :001).8
Persuasiveness of the advertisement for the mood-re-storing CD. To assess the
overall persuasiveness of the ad for the mood-restoring CD (i.e., Tweed Monkeys), we created an index by combining
the difference between participants! two ratings of the Tweed Monkeys CD and the Crystal Hammer CD and the number of
Tweed Monkeys songs to which participants chose to listen. In creating this index, we standardized each of the
vari-ables. The Cronbach a for this index was .74.
To test our prediction that participants who received the sad-face prime and
expected to interact with another person would be more persuaded by the ad for the Tweed Monkeys CD than
participants in the other three conditions, we conducted an ANOVA on this persua-sion index with subliminal priming
condition and future task expectation condition as the factors. This analysis revealed only a significant
interaction between the sub-liminal priming condition and the future task expecta-tion condition (F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 8:20,
p < :01). Participants who received the sad-face prime and expected to interact with another person were more
persuaded by the ad for the Tweed Monkeys CD (M ¼ :46) than participants who received the neutral prime and
expected to interact with another person (M ¼ %:31) (F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 10:48, p < :01), and than participants who
received the sad-face prime and expected to be alone (M ¼ %:17) (F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 7:34, p < :01). In addition, the
test of our specific hypothesis that participants who received the sad-face prime and expected to interact with
another person would be more persuaded by the ad for the Tweed Monkeys CD than participants in the other three
conditions (M ¼ %:16) was significant (F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 10:24, p < :01). Because the three measures (the two attitude
ratings and the choice of songs) that contributed to the persuasion index were related with one another, it is not
surprising that both the attitude ratings and the choice of songs were individually influenced by our
manipula-tions. We now examine attitudes and behavior sepa-rately.
Participants’ ratings of the CDs. We combined the two attitude ratings of the
Tweed Monkeys CD and the two ratings of the Crystal Hammer CD. These measures were highly correlated for both CDs
(r!s. 74 and .76, respectively). To analyze the effect of our manipulations on participants! ratings of the CDs, we
conducted a 2 ! 2 ! 2 mixed-model ANOVA with subliminal prim-ing condition (sad-face prime vs. neutral prime) and
future task expectation condition (expect to interact with another person vs. alone) as the between-partici-pants
factors and with CD (Tweed Monkeys CD vs. Crystal Hammer CD) as the within-participants factor.
This analysis revealed a marginally significant effect of the subliminal prime (F
ð1; 80Þ ¼ 3:59, p < :10) and a marginally significant difference in the ratings of the two bands (F ð1; 80Þ ¼
2:94, p < :10). Both of these effects, however, were qualified by a significant 3-way interac-tion (F ð1; 80Þ ¼
4:70, p < :05). In interpreting this in-teraction, we first analyzed the effect of our manipulations on
participants! ratings of Crystal Ham-mer CD. This analysis revealed only a marginally sig-nificant main effect for
subliminal prime (F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 3:38, p < :10), such that participants who received the sad-face prime (M ¼ 4:43)
tended to rate the Crystal Hammer CD more positively than participants who re-ceived the neutral prime (M ¼
4:05).
Next, we analyzed the effect of our manipulations on participants! ratings of the
Tweed Monkeys CD. In contrast to their ratings of the Crystal Hammer CD, participants! ratings of the Tweed Monkeys
CD revealed a significant interaction between the subliminal priming condition
and the future task expectation condition (F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 3:74, p ¼
:05). As can be seen in Fig. 3, participants who received the
sad-face prime and ex-pected to interact with another person rated the Tweed Monkeys CD more positively than
participants who received the neutral prime and expected to interact with another person (F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 5:54, p <
:05), and than participants who received the sad-face prime and ex-pected to be alone (F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 5:59, p <
:05). In addi-tion, the test of our specific hypothesis that participants who received the sad-face prime and
expected to interact with another person would rate the Tweed Monkeys CD more positively than participants in the
other three conditions was significant (F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 6:13, p ¼ :01).
Choice of songs. Because participants' choice of Tweed Monkeys and Crystal Hammer
songs were not independent, to analyze the effect of our manipulations on participants! choice of songs we conducted
an AN-OVA with subliminal priming condition (sad-face prime vs. neutral prime) and future task expectation
condition (expect to interact with another person vs. alone) as the factors and the number of Tweed Monkeys songs
cho-sen as the dependent variable.
This analysis revealed a significant interaction between the subliminal priming
condition and the future task expectation condition (F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 6:57, p ¼ :01). As can be seen in Fig. 4,
participants who received the sad-face prime and expected to interact with another person chose significantly more
Tweed Monkeys songs than participants who received the neutral prime and expected to interact with another person
(F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 7:43, p < :01), and marginally more Tweed Monkeys songs than par-ticipants who received the
sad-face prime and expected to be alone (F ð1; 80Þ ¼ 3:56, p < :10). In addition, once again, the test of our
specific hypothesis that participants who received the sad-face prime and expected to interact with another person
would choose more Tweed Monkeys songs than participants in the other three conditions was significant (F ð1; 80Þ ¼
5:24, p < :05).
We also analyzed participants' choice of songs non-parametrically by comparing the
number of participants who chose more Tweed Monkeys songs to the number of participants who chose more Crystal
Hammer songs. When participants received the sad-face prime and ex-pected to interact with another person, 76%
chose more Tweed Monkeys songs than Crystal Hammer songs showing a clear preference for the Tweed Monkeys band
(v2ð1Þ ¼ 5:76, p < :02). In contrast, participants in each of the other three conditions showed no systematic
preference (v2sð1Þ < 1). Moreover, more participants who received the sad-face prime and expected to interact
with another person preferred to listen to more Tweed Monkeys songs than participants who received the neutral
prime and expected to interact with another person (40%) (v2ð1Þ ¼ 5:53, p < :02), and than partici-pants who
received the sad-face prime and expected to be alone (45%) (v2ð1Þ ¼ 4:25, p < :05). Finally, the test of our
specific hypothesis that more participants who received the sad-face prime and expected to interact with another
person would prefer to listen to more Tweed Monkeys songs than participants in the other three conditions (46%) was
significant (v2ð1Þ ¼ 5:76, p < :02).
These results suggest that when people are sublimi-nally primed with the concept
of sadness and are in a situation in which they are motivated to restore their mood they will be more persuaded by
an ad that targets this motive.
General discussion
Taken together these studies suggest that subliminal priming can enhance
persuasion. We have found, however, that it does so only when certain conditions are met. Specifically, subliminal
priming goal-relevant cog-nitions only influenced behavior and enhanced the per-suasiveness of an ad targeting the
goal when people were motivated to pursue the goal. In Study 1, we found that subliminally priming thirst increased
the amount that people drank when they were thirsty but not when they were satiated. In Study 2, we found that
thirsty people who were subliminally primed with thirst were more persuaded by the ad for the thirst-quenching
beverage than were thirsty people subliminally primed with neu-tral words. In Study 3, we found that subliminally
priming sadness enhanced the persuasiveness an ad for a CD with mood-restoring music when people expected to
interact with another person (and were presumably motivated to repair their mood). Subliminally priming sadness did
not effect the persuasiveness of the ad for the mood-restoring CD when people expected to be alone (and were
presumably unmotivated to repair their mood), and subliminally priming a neutral stimulus did not effect the
persuasiveness of the ad for the mood-re-storing CD even when people expected to interact with another
person.
Importantly, these findings generalize across quite diverse domains (quenching
thirst vs. restoring mood), types of subliminal primes (words vs. photos), and motivational situations
(physiological thirst vs. the ex-pectation of interacting with another person). In addi-tion, the results hold for
both attitudes and behavior.
Together these results suggest that both priming goal-relevant cognitions and the
motive to pursue the goal are necessary for ads that target the goal to be more per-suasive. Subliminal priming per
se had no effect. Rather, subliminal priming only in combination with a relevant motivational state influenced the
pursuit of the goal.
One explanation for this pattern of results could draw upon Schachter!s (1964)
position that both arousal and cognitive cues are necessary for emotion. For example, in our thirst studies neither
a moderate physical need for water nor subliminally priming thirst increased drinking (Study 1) or enhanced
persuasion (Study 2). It is only when moderately thirsty (or aroused in Schachter!s terms) participants are
subliminally primed (or exposed to a cognitive cue in Schachter!s terms) that these effects occur. Although
appealing, this explanation does not seem be as compelling of an account of the data from Study 3, because it is
unclear why the sad-face prime would act as a cognitive cue that would label whatever arousal occurs from expecting
to interact with another person as happiness.
Another explanation for why multiple conditions may be necessary for our results
draws upon Higgins! (Hig-gins, 1996; Higgins & Brendl, 1995) notion that for primes to influence behavior they
must be both accessible and applicable. In other words, priming alone does not always automatically determine
behavior. There are motivational constraints in the form of situational ap-plicability. Thus in our studies we only
found actual goal pursuit when concepts were accessible (i.e., when they were primed) and applicable (i.e., when
participants were motivated to pursue the goal). This functional constraint on the power of priming would seem to
make adaptive sense. For example, it would not be adaptive if priming ‘‘suicides’’ led to suicidal behavior in most
people. As-suming that the usual situation is that people want to live, such primes (e.g., in the media) should
only lead to suicide among those who are desperately depressed.
The idea that accessibility and applicability are nec-essary for primes to
influence behavior can also offer an alternative conceptualization for some recent findings on the relation between
priming and behavior. For ex-ample, Macrae and Johnston (1998) have shown that priming helpfulness leads to helping
behavior unless people are late for an appointment. One interpretation (the so-called inhibitor account) of these
results is that priming automatically leads to behavior, it is just that when the participants were late this
automatic priming-behavior link was inhibited (cf., Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). An alternative account
suggested by our findings is that priming leads to helpfulness when people are not late because (given the norm of
social responsibility) most people are chronically motivated to be helpful. When they are late, however, their
situational motiva-tion to be on time renders the motive to be helpful in-applicable. One could also imagine that
not all people are motivated to be helpful. For example, we might suggest that Ebenezer Scrooge (or possibly the
Grinch) would not be helpful when primed with helpfulness even when they are not late. In our own research
(Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2001), we have found that non-re-strained eaters are unaffected by the primes
‘‘eat’’ and ‘‘binge,’’ whereas restrained eaters (who are chronically hungry) drink more of a high caloric beverage
when they are exposed to these same primes. Thus, we believe that future research should carefully consider the
function-ality of primes both in terms of their situational and dispositional applicability in investigating their
influence on behavior.
Finally, we believe that this research has important practical implications.
Although our exact procedures may not lend themselves to the real world of advertising, we suspect that
practitioners of persuasion could de-velop clever techniques that utilize our ideas in an effort to enhance their
persuasive messages. Thus, even though previous research has failed to find evidence for sub-liminal persuasion,
suggesting that we need not worry about the possibility that people could be persuaded subliminally, this
conclusion is perhaps a bit too opti-mistic. Our research suggests that people might be ex-ploited by subliminal
priming procedures. Thus, we believe that the results of these studies suggest that there should be a renewed
debate about the potential use and abuse of subliminal procedures in persuasion.
Acknowledgments
The research in the paper was supported in part by grants from the Social Sciences
and Humanities Re-search Council to both the second and third authors. We thank Michael Ross, Leandre Fabrigar,
Derek Koehler, and Ziva Kunda for their insightful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript and the authors
gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Trish Unruh, Tanya Nermerich, and Elizabeth Leal.
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